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Abstract: This paper investigates the real-time effects of foreign exchange intervention using 
official intraday intervention data provided by the Danish central bank. Denmark is currently 
pursuing an active intervention policy under the provisions of the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM II) and intervenes on a discretionary basis when considered necessary. Prior participation 
in ERM II is a requirement for adoption of the Euro. Therefore, our study is of particular 
relevance for the new European Union member states that are either currently participating in 
ERM II or expected to do so at a later date as well as for Denmark. Our analysis employs the two-
step weighted least squares estimation procedure of Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega 
(2003) and an array of robustness tests. We find that intervention exerts a statistically and 
economically significant influence on exchange rate returns when the direction of intervention is 
consistent with fundamentals and intervention is carried out during a period of high exchange rate 
volatility. We also show that the exchange rate does not adjust instantaneously to the 
unannounced and discretionary interventions under study. We conclude that intervention can be 
an important short-term policy instrument for exchange rate management. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the real-time (intraday) effects of Danish central bank intervention in the 
Euro (EUR) market.1 The interventions under study are carried out under the provisions of the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II). Proprietary data on official, intraday intervention 
transactions, provided by the Danish central bank (Danmarks Nationalbank, henceforth DN), 
facilitates our investigation. Our investigation employs the time-series econometrics of Andersen 
and Bollerslev (1998) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003). 
Our motivation for assessing the intraday effects of DN intervention is two-fold. First, 
prior successful participation in the ERM II is a requirement for joining the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) and for adoption of the EUR. The current Danish ERM II exchange rate 
management experience can, therefore, provide important insights and normative policy 
recommendations of particular relevance for Denmark and the 6 new European Union (EU) 
member states that are currently participating in the ERM II. Similarly, our study seems to have 
particular relevance for potential EU candidate countries as well as the 5 new EU member states 
that are expected to participate in the ERM II at a future date.2
Second, it is very rare that a central bank makes available official intraday intervention 
data. In fact, until now only the Bank of Canada and the Swiss National Bank have made such 
data available.3 It has, however, been more than 8 and 11 years, respectively, since the Bank of 
Canada and the Swiss National Bank last intervened. By contrast, Denmark is currently pursuing 
an active intervention policy and intervenes on a discretionary basis when considered necessary. 
The DN intraday intervention data, therefore, constitutes a unique opportunity to learn about the 
                                                 
1 See Humpage (2003), Neely (2005), and Sarno and Taylor (2001) for recent surveys of the intervention 
literature. 
2 Denmark and the new EU member states Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Slovakia 
currently participate in the ERM II; the new EU member states Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania do not. Slovenia joined the EMU on 1 January 2007. 
3 The Swiss National Bank intraday intervention data is publicly available; the Bank of Canada intraday 
intervention data is not. 
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real-time effects of foreign exchange intervention carried out by a central bank that is currently 
intervening. 
The best known studies of the now historical data from the Bank of Canada and the Swiss 
National Bank are the important contributions by Fischer and Zurlinden (1999) and Payne and 
Vitale (2003), both of which assess the effects of Swiss interventions. Fischer and Zurlinden 
(1999) focus on (scaled) exchange rate changes measured between consecutive interventions and 
use an irregular time-series model as the foundation for their analysis. They find that only initial 
interventions matter while subsequent interventions are ineffective. Within the context of an 
event study approach, Payne and Vitale (2003) find evidence of a systematic link between 
intervention and both exchange rate returns and volatility. In a more recent contribution, 
Pasquariello (2006a) also finds evidence that Swiss National Bank interventions have significant 
effects on exchange rate returns.4
The Bank of Canada intraday intervention data has been analyzed by Beattie and Fillion 
(1999) and Fatum and King (2005).5 Beattie and Fillion (1999) conduct a time-series analysis of 
the intraday effects of intervention and find some evidence of reduced exchange rate volatility. 
Fatum and King (2005) use an event study methodology and find that intervention has a 
significant influence on the exchange rate level, in the intended direction, and some weaker 
evidence of a short-lived reduction of exchange rate volatility.6
Our study employs data on official, intraday DN intervention in the Danish-Krone/Euro 
(DKK/EUR) foreign exchange rate market over the 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004 time-
                                                 
4 In a related study, Burkhard and Fischer (2006) find evidence of intraday effects of Swiss intervention 
threats during the 2002 to 2005 period when no actual Swiss interventions occurred. Fischer (2003) also 
analyzes the official Swiss National Bank intraday intervention data. 
5 See D’Souza (2002) and Fatum (2006) for daily data studies of Bank of Canada intervention. 
6 Studies of intraday effects of intervention that use Reuters data or use additional information/assumptions 
regarding the intraday timing of intervention operations include Beine, Lahaye, Laurent, Neely and Palm 
(2006), Beine, Laurent and Palm (2003), Cai, Cheung, Lee and Melvin (2001), Chang and Taylor (1998), 
Chari (2006), Dominguez (2003, 2006), Goodhart and Hesse (1993), Kim (2005), Peiers (1997), and Scalia 
(2004). Fischer (2004) illustrates the lack of accuracy of Reuters reports in the context of Swiss 
interventions; Dominguez (2006) argues that it is likely that Reuters provides better coverage in the context 
of G3 interventions. 
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period as well as the bid and the offer spot DKK/EUR exchange rates at the end of every 5-
minute interval over every 24-hour period. The latter data was purchased from Olsen and 
Associates. We focus our investigation on the level (exchange rate return) effects of intervention.7
In order to properly model the well-known idiosyncrasies of intraday exchange rate data 
while at the same time allow intervention to affect both the conditional mean and the conditional 
variance, we adopt the two-step weighted least squares (WLS) technique proposed by Andersen 
and Bollerslev (1998) and recently applied by Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003). 
Specifically, we obtain the residuals from a (first step) standard conditional mean model of 5-
minute exchange rate returns. We then use the concept of realized volatility and a Fourier flexible 
form with several trigonometric terms to model the intraday pattern of these residuals. Lastly, we 
use the fitted residuals from the second model to perform a WLS estimation of the (first step) 
model of exchange rate returns. In addition, we follow Andrews (1993) and test for parameter 
instability. We find significant evidence of one change point in our data and, as a result, we carry 
out the analysis on the full sample as well as separately on two sub-samples. 
Consistent with the aforementioned intraday studies of Bank of Canada and Swiss 
National Bank intervention and consistent with the findings of Dominguez (2003), who examines 
the intraday effects of G3 interventions, we find statistically significant evidence that intervention 
affects the level of the exchange rate in the intended direction. Specifically, we find a statistically 
an economically significant effect of intervention when intervention is consistent with 
fundamentals and coinciding with a period of relatively high exchange rate volatility. Moreover, 
we find that it takes about 30 minutes before the exchange rate has fully adjusted to the 
intervention news.  
As one of several robustness checks, we control for the timed announcement of other 
types of Danish and EUR macro news, including news regarding balance of payments, CPI, GDP 
                                                 
7 The key goal of intervention in the context of ERM II is to ensure that the value of the currency of the 
ERM II member state vis-à-vis the EUR is kept within a publicly announced fluctuation band. Therefore, 
the level effects of intervention are of primary interest. 
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and unemployment. We do so to ensure that our findings regarding the effects of intervention are 
not tainted by the coinciding arrival of other news. Inclusion of the news variables does not affect 
our results. As an important methodological robustness check, we follow Andersen, Bollerslev, 
Diebold and Vega (2003) and reassess the effects of intervention on exchange rate returns using 
heteroskedasticity- and serial-correlation consistent (HAC) standard errors. The HAC results are 
qualitatively identical to those stemming from the more sophisticated two-step WLS procedure. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of 
the institutional aspects regarding ERM II and DN intervention. Section 3 presents the data and 
Section 4 explains the econometric methodology. Section 5 presents the results and assesses the 
fit of the model. Section 6 presents several robustness checks. Section 7 discusses the main 
results and Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Aspects 
With the launch of the EUR on 1 January 1999, the ERM II was introduced and replaced the 
exchange rate mechanism (ERM I) of the European Monetary System (EMS).8 According to the 
EU Accession Treaty, successful participation in ERM II is a requirement for joining the EMU 
and for adoption of the EUR. Currently Denmark as well as 6 new EU members participate in 
ERM II. Denmark has participated since 1 January 1999, Estonia and Lithuania since 28 June 
2004, Cyprus, Latvia, and Malta since 2 May 2005, and Slovakia since 28 November 2005.9 
Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania are expected to follow.10, 11
                                                 
8 See Brandner, Grech and Stix (2006) for a recent analysis of intervention in the EMS. 
9 Prior to the launch of the EUR, Denmark participated in ERM I. Denmark has since 1982 successfully 
maintained a stable exchange rate vis-à-vis a basket of other EMS currencies and subsequently vis-à-vis the 
EUR in the ERM II. 
10 See Disyatat and Galati (2005) and BIS (2005) for studies of intervention in emerging markets, including 
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. See also Hochreiter and Siklos (2006) for a brief discussion of 
monetary policy and exchange rate issues pertaining to the new EU member states and candidate countries. 
11 Two old EU member states do not participate in neither the EUR nor ERM II. Great Britain is under no 
obligation to move to Stage Three of the EMU and does not appear to be taking immediate steps towards 
joining the EUR. Sweden did not join the EUR at its inception and decided to pursue a policy of inflation 
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In ERM II, a bilateral central rate and a deviation band is set for the currency of the 
participating country vis-à-vis the EUR, but not against the currency of the other member states. 
The DKK/EUR central rate is 7.46038 and the deviation band is set to +/- 2.25 percent. All other 
ERM II member states maintain their respective currencies within a +/- 15 percent deviation 
band. 
In order to keep its currency inside the deviation band, the ERM II member state adjusts 
its short term interest rates and/or intervenes in the foreign exchange market. If the currency 
reaches either the upper or the lower limit of the deviation band, both the European Central Bank 
(ECB) and the central bank of the member state in question intervene to maintain the exchange 
rate inside the interior of the band. The ECB is only obligated to intervene when a currency 
reaches one of the band limits. In such cases, to ensure that the finite holdings of foreign 
exchange reserves do not restrict the ability to intervene, the ECB and the intervening national 
central bank may grant each other unlimited intervention credit with an initial maturity of up to 3 
months. Interest is charged on such credit, and the credit may be extended.  
Usually interventions when the currency is on the limit of the deviation band are avoided. 
Instead, interventions are carried out when the currency is in the interior of the band. In the case 
of Denmark in ERM II, at no point has the Danish currency been near either the upper or the 
lower limit of the band (see Figure 1). Accordingly, our analysis pertains only to one-sided 
interventions (i.e. interventions carried out unilaterally by the DN) for which intervention credits 
have not been required.12  
DN interventions are discretionary, unannounced and automatically sterilized. According 
to DN traders, half of the DN interventions carried out during the period under study were 
                                                                                                                                                 
targeting instead of ERM II participation. On 14 September 2003, Sweden held a referendum in which it 
was decided not to adopt the EUR and subsequently Sweden has not joined ERM II. 
12 The ERM II member states are not obligated to simultaneously inform or get permission from the ECB 
when carrying out unilateral interventions. However, the ECB is automatically informed about the 
interventions at the daily fixing concert involving all ERM II member states at 14.15 GMT+1 and again at 
the end of the business-day at 17.05 GMT+1. 
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conducted by phone, i.e. the DN trader in charge of an intervention operation contacts the market 
counterpart directly via phone. The remaining intervention transactions were conducted through a 
centralized market place (broker or electronic trading platform).13
For additional details regarding the ERM II and the Danish foreign exchange rate policy 
see Danmarks Nationalbank (2003a), ECB (2004), and EU (2006). 
 
3. Data 
3.1. The Intraday Intervention Data 
The intervention data covers all DN interventions in the DKK/EUR market over the 1 January 
2002 to 31 December 2004 period. It includes the exact amount and time-stamp to the nearest 
minute obtained directly from the trade-sheet of each intervention transaction. Intervention 
amounts are quoted in EUR and a positive amount denotes a purchase of EUR against a sale of 
DKK. In accordance with the ERM II provisions, the DN trader conducting an intervention 
operation is obligated to write the amount and the exact time of the operation on the trade-sheet 
immediately after the completion of each individual intervention transaction. At the latest, this 
information is forwarded to the ECB by the end of the trading day. Our intraday intervention data 
consist of this extremely reliable information. 
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics of the intervention data. 14 Our sample consists of a 
total of 89 intervention days, encompassing a total of 220 intervention transactions. On 
intervention days, the average intervention amount is EUR 164 millions. A total of 68 
intervention days consist of EUR purchases. Figure 1 shows that all interventions occur when the 
DKK/EUR rate is in the interior of the deviation band. In fact, at no point during the period under 
                                                 
13 Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain detailed information regarding whether each individual 
intervention transaction was carried out by phone or via centralized trading.  
14 Given the confidential nature of the intervention data, we are not at liberty to display or describe this data 
in greater detail. 
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study does the distance between the DKK/EUR rate and either band limit exceed the distance 
between the DKK/EUR rate and the central rate.15
 
3.2 The Exchange Rate Data 
The high-frequency DKK/EUR exchange rate data is provided by Olsen and Associates, collected 
from commercial banks by Tenfore and Oanda, and covers the full 2002 to 2004 sample period. 
The data consists of the bid and the offer spot exchange rate at the end of every 5-minute interval 
over every 24-hour period. 
The quotes are indicative quotes, i.e. not necessarily traded quotes. Therefore, the 
possibility of the data containing irrelevant quotes at which no rational investor will trade is a 
concern. Another concern is the possibility of our data including a keying error by a dealer. In 
order to take into account these concerns we follow Dacorogna, Müller, Nagler, Olsen and Pictet 
(1993) and filter the data for anomalies and bad quotes. 
We employ exchange rate data with a frequency of 5 minutes, instead of exchange rate 
data with the same frequency as our intervention data, i.e. a frequency of 1 minute. It is well-
known that market microstructures such as non-synchronous trading and bid-ask bounces are 
likely to render econometric analysis invalid by introducing artificial statistical properties (e.g. 
negative serial correlation) strong enough to drown the "true" properties of the data. It is also 
well-known that the severity of these microstructure concerns decreases at lower frequencies.16 
Therefore, instead of using the smallest frequency possible (which in this case corresponds to 
tick-by-tick data), we follow the standard literature and use the typical frequency of 5 minutes. 
For additional details see Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997). 
                                                 
15 During the 3 year period under study, the DKK/EUR exchange rate trades between 7.4150 and 7.4592 
DKK/EUR. For comparison, the +/- 2.25 percent deviation band constitutes a permissible trading range 
between 7.2925 and 7.6282 DKK/EUR. The mean of the DKK/EUR exchange rate across the sample 
period is 7.437 DKK/EUR, thus close to the central rate and far away from either band limit. 
16 Intuitively, the "noise" caused by the microstructures remains the same across the higher and the lower 
sampling frequency while the properties of the "true" process increase at the lower frequency. 
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Following Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega 
(2003), our midpoint (log) exchange rate price at each 5-minute point is constructed by linearly 
interpolating the average of the preceding and immediately following (log) bid and offer quotes. 
The continuously compounded 5-minute returns ( ) are calculated as the change in the 5-minute 
midpoint prices.
tR
17
It is standard in the intraday literature on widely traded currency pairs (e.g. the 
USD/EUR, the USD/DEM, the USD/JPY, and the USD/GBP) to define a trading day to start at 
21.05 GMT the night before and end at 21.00 GMT on the evening of the trading day in question 
(see Bollerslev and Domowitz, 1993) and, furthermore, to define a weekend to start at 21.05 
GMT Friday and finish 21.00 GMT Sunday (see Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega, 2003). 
The Danish exchange rate market, however, is markedly different from the major exchange rate 
markets in that there is very little or virtually no trading of the Danish currency outside of 
standard Danish business hours (see Danmarks Nationalbank 2003a and ECB 2004). Therefore, 
we define a trading day in the Danish currency market to start at 8.00 GMT+1 and finish at 17.00 
GMT+1.18 Consequently, our analysis considers a total of 752 trading days consisting of a total of 
80476 5-minute DKK/EUR exchange rate returns.19 Importantly, our trading day definition 
encompasses all intervention transactions in the period under study. 
As shown by Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993) and Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and 
others, high-frequency foreign exchange data can be expected to display often complex intraday 
periodicities (intraday seasonality). Table 2 summarizes key statistical properties of our 5-minute 
returns. As expected, the returns have fatter tails than a normal distribution (with a kurtosis of 
                                                 
17 Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003, p. 40) note that “Goodhart, Ito and Payne (1996) and 
Danielsson and Payne (1999) find that the basic characteristics of 5-minute returns constructed from quotes 
closely match those calculated from transaction prices.” Transaction prices are not available for the 
DKK/EUR exchange rate market. 
18 This definition of a trading day carries over naturally to a definition of a weekend, i.e. we define a 
weekend to start at 17.05 GMT+1 Friday and finish at 8.00 GMT+1 Monday. 
19 We also deleted the following fixed holidays from the analysis: 1 January, Easter (3 holidays), Christmas 
(24/25/26 December), 31 December as well as 4 Denmark-specific holidays (Store Bededag, Kristi 
Himmelfartsdag, Anden Pinsedag, Grundlovsdag).  
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18), and the Bera-Jarque test for normality is strongly rejected. The rejection is mainly attributed 
to excess kurtosis. The 5-minute return series is far from being a white-noise process due to long 
memory, as evidenced by the Ljung-box Q-test statistic which rejects that the first 540 
autocorrelations (corresponding to one business-week) are jointly zero.  
Figure 2 shows that, although the autocorrelations are small, they frequently breach the 
confidence bands. This long memory can be attributed to daily periodicity. The absolute returns 
show a periodicity through the day (with breaks, of course, due to our business hours trading day 
definition).20
 
4. Econometric Methodology 
The previous section described DKK/EUR exchange rate data characteristics that are very similar 
to those found by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega 
(2003) in their analyses of high-frequency exchange rate data. Clearly, the long memory and the 
intraday periodicity of our exchange rate series would affect the residuals of a standard OLS 
regression of interventions on exchange rate returns, thereby invalidating standard errors and 
rendering the associated test statistics unreliable. Consequently, we employ the procedure 
initiated by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and recently applied by Andersen, Bollerslev, 
Diebold and Vega (2003). 
Following Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003), we first obtain the residuals 
from a standard conditional mean model of the 5-minute exchange rate returns. We then use the 
concept of realized volatility and a Fourier flexible form to model the intraday pattern of these 
residuals. In the last step, we use the fitted residuals from the second model to perform a WLS 
estimation of the first model. We obtain consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of the 
                                                 
20 In general, intraday patterns arise in high-frequency data as the same events – lunch break, market 
opening, market closing and so forth – happen every day at the exact same time, creating correlations 
between certain 5-minute intervals now and certain 5-minute intervals several business days later. This 
periodicity is negligible for lower frequency data. 
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response of the foreign exchange series to an intervention by this filtering procedure (see 
Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998, for details). 
We model the response of the DKK/EUR exchange rate return, Rt, as a linear function of 
J lagged values of the return itself and the contemporaneous and K lags of the intervention 
variable, It:  
(1)  ∑ ∑
= =
−− =+++=
J
j
t
K
k
ktkjtjt TtIRR
1 0
0 ..1,εγββ
As noted earlier, T=80476. We choose J=5 based on the Schwartz and Akaike 
information criteria and we set K=6, i.e. we include 6 lags of the intervention variable 
(corresponding to 30 minutes) and vary this number in our robustness checks. We first estimate 
equation (1) by OLS and obtain the estimated residuals tεˆ .21
The next step is to model the volatility pattern using the estimated residuals of equation 
(1). Again, we follow Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) who suggest the following 
parameterization:       
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where tεˆ  is the residual of equation (1) and its absolute value proxies for the volatility in the 5-
minute interval t, c is a vector of normalizing constants, n is the number of intervals on a day (in 
our case 108), tσˆ is the one-day ahead volatility forecast for day t (i.e. the day that contains 
interval t), q is a specific intraday calendar effect, Q is the total number of calendar effects 
                                                 
21 We follow Brandner, Grech and Stix (2006) and take into account the possibility of mean reversion by 
including, as an additional explanatory variable, a measure of the deviation of the DKK/EUR exchange rate 
from the central rate. The deviation variable proved insignificant in all our estimations and was therefore 
excluded from the remainder of the analysis. Considering that throughout the period under study the 
DKK/EUR exchange rate is comfortably in the interior of the +/- 2.25 percent deviation band, it is not 
surprising that the impact of mean reversion is insignificant. Moreover, we included the DKK/EUR interest 
rate differential (contemporaneous and lagged values) to the returns model. We found these additional 
explanatory variables to be insignificant as well and, therefore, subsequently excluded these terms. 
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accounted for (Q=8, based on the Schwartz and the Akaike information criteria), rEUR-rDKK is the 
EUR-DKK interest rate differential, and denotes the residuals (assumed to be standard 
normal).
tu
22
We model the lower frequency intraday pattern (the first term after the vector of 
constants) using the concept of realized volatility (RV). RV is defined as the daily sum of squared 
returns. Andersen, Bollerslev and Diebold (2002) show that RV constitutes an unbiased, efficient 
and asymptotically consistent estimate of the true daily quadratic variation. A key advantage of 
using RV is that this semi-parametric approach does not require additional model estimation.23, 24
Clearly, the realized volatility forecast cannot capture the observed cyclical intraday 
patterns. Therefore, in order to capture the slow decay in the autocorrelations (shown in Figure 2), 
we model the higher frequency periodicity by inclusion of a Fourier flexible form (see Gallant, 
1981, Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998, and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega, 2003). Our 
goal is to fit the pattern of the residuals from equation (1) as best as possible and the Fourier 
flexible form allows for a model specification as flexible as possible. The Fourier flexible form 
consists of a number of sine- and cosine terms with varying degrees of periodicity (the terms in 
the parenthesis of equation 1). 
Consistent with Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and 
Vega (2003) who include their macro news variables in the volatility equation, we include the 
intervention variable (i.e. our news variable) in the volatility model. 
                                                 
22 As shown, we also include the differential between the DN policy rate (the Folio rate) and the ECB 
Refirate (contemporaneous as well as lagged values) to the volatility model. We set the number of lags to 
two, based on the Schwartz and the Akaike criteria. This inclusion improves the overall fit of the model. 
Importantly, whether or not we include the interest rate differential in our volatility model does not affect 
the significance of the coefficient estimates associated with the intervention variable. 
23 Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) suggest the use of a GARCH-type model for the lower frequency 
volatility using daily foreign exchange returns. While such models have been successful in modelling the 
variation of the daily financial market volatility (see Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner, 1992), we follow the 
more recent literature and use the concept of RV.  
24 While a seemingly obvious approach for calculating the RV is to use 5-minute returns, this would create 
an endogeneity problem as the 5-minute returns are also present in the estimated residuals from our initial 
estimation of equation 1. We, therefore, calculate the RV using 30 minute returns. See Anderson, Hansen 
and Sebestyén, 2006, for additional details. 
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 Our null hypothesis is that intervention is effective and works in the intended direction, 
i.e. we expect a positive coefficient estimate for the interventions ( 0>kγ ) such that a purchase 
of EUR against a sale of DKK is associated with a depreciation of the DKK vis-à-vis the EUR.25
 
4.1 Structural breaks 
In order to ensure that our statistical inference is valid it is necessary to also test for structural 
breaks and parameter instability.26 We do so using the theory of Andrews (1993). Our null 
hypothesis is that the estimated parameters are stable across the sample, i.e. 
tH t ∀= ββ:0 where β is a vector of the coefficients of interest. This vector can be a subset of 
the parameters or the full parameter vector containing all the coefficients in the model. The 
alternative hypothesis is that parameter instability is present, i.e.  , 
where 
⎩⎨
⎧
+=
==
,..1
,..1
:
2
1
1 πβ
πββ
Ttfor
Ttfor
H t
π  denotes the change point. The change point is a number strictly between 0 and 1, i.e. π  
is a certain percentage of the full sample.27
Andrews (1993) suggests a test statistic of the form: )(sup )( ππ TXΠ∈ , where )(πTX  
can be the Wald, the Likelihood Ratio or the Lagrange Multiplier statistic. We apply the Wald 
test and use the following test statistic: 
                                                 
25 We do not attempt to address an issue of simultaneity, if any. While the decision to intervene in the 
context of ERM II is necessarily determined by the exchange rate market developments, it seems in the 
context of our intraday analysis reasonable to assume that the intervention decision is not based on the 
contemporaneous exchange rate movement. See Neely (2005) for a general discussion and Neely (2006) for 
a survey-based assessment of how fast intervening central banks react to exchange rate market 
developments. 
26 Our data encompasses periods with varying degrees of daily volatility and periods with relatively strong 
DKK as well as relatively weak DKK against the EUR, as can be seen in Figure 1. Furthermore, the Danish 
monetary policy stance was held constant during the early part of our sample period while the latter part of 
our sample coincides with monetary policy easing. See Danmarks Nationalbank (2002, 2003b and 2004) 
for additional details regarding the Danish economy during the period under study. 
27 If the potential change point is known in advance, a simple Wald test (or similar) can be applied. 
However, we do not have advance knowledge regarding the exact timing of a potential change point, 
thereby invalidating a simple testing strategy. As shown in Andrews 1993, when the potential change point 
is unknown and treated as stochastic, complications arise as the change point parameter only appears under 
the alternative hypothesis. This invalidates the large sample asymptotic distributions for, as an example, the  
simple Wald test statistic. 
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where  are the partial-sample estimators of the coefficients of interest (using the 
first 
2,1),(ˆ =ii πβ
π  percent and the 1-π  percent of the sample, respectively), and  are the 
estimated covariance matrices for the partial-samples. Andrews (1993) shows that this test 
statistic follows the square of a standardized tied-down Bessel process of order p, where p is the 
number of restrictions in the hypothesis. 
2,1),(ˆ =iVi π
We first test for parameter stability across all the estimated coefficients and find the value 
of the test statistic )(sup )( ππ TWΠ∈  to equal 165 at 2.0=π  (i.e. for the sub-sample that includes 
the first 20 percent of the data). The critical value of a squared standardized tied-down Bessel 
process of order 13 is 31.10, thus the null-hypothesis of parameter stability at the 20 percent 
change point mark is strongly rejected. We also utilize the ability of the testing procedure to focus 
on only a sub-sample of the parameter vector to test for parameter stability across the sum of the 
intervention coefficients and separately for each individual intervention coefficient. As an 
additional robustness check, we perform the same change point test for a specification with a full 
one-hour lag of interventions included (i.e. 12 lags of interventions). Again, we find significant 
evidence of a change point at the 20 percent mark. 
In sum, we find strong and robust evidence of a change point at the 20 percent mark, 
implying a structural break on 16 August 2002. Accordingly, sub-sample 1 covers the 1 January 
2002 to 16 August 2002 period, sub-sample 2 covers the 17 August 2002 to 31 December 2004 
period. We carry out our estimations on the full sample as well as separately across the two sub-
samples. 
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5. Results 
Table 3 displays the results of the WLS estimation of equation (1). The first column of estimated 
coefficients pertains to the full sample while the second and the third column show the results for 
sub-samples 1 and 2, respectively. As noted, intervention is considered effective if the associated 
coefficient estimate is positive (a positive amount of intervention constitutes a purchase of EUR 
against a sale of DKK; the exchange rate is measured in terms of DKK per EUR). 
Table 3 shows that for the full sample the coefficient estimates associated with 
contemporaneous and the first lag of intervention are highly significant and negative, i.e. the 
opposite sign of what is expected, and lags 4 through 6 are significant and positive, i.e. in the 
intended direction. The Wald test of the hypothesis that the (positive) sum of the estimated 
intervention coefficients is equal to zero cannot be rejected. 
Turning to sub-sample 1, the next column shows that the first and the sixth lags of 
intervention are marginally significant and in opposite directions. Again, we cannot reject that the 
there is no cumulative effect of intervention. In sum, for the full sample and for sub-sample 1 we 
fail to detect a statistically significant cumulative effect of intervention. 
The sub-sample 2 results, however, are different. The last column shows a negative and 
significant coefficient estimate of the first lag of intervention, and positive and significant 
coefficient estimates associated with the fourth and fifth lags. Comparing the magnitude (in 
absolute terms) of the two highly significant intervention coefficient estimates we see that the 
coefficient of the variable associated with the “correct” sign is almost twice the magnitude of the 
coefficient of the variable associated with the “wrong” sign. Moreover, the Wald test strongly 
rejects that the (positive) sum of the estimated intervention coefficients is equal to zero. 
Therefore, we accept the alternative hypothesis that the cumulative effect of intervention on the 
conditional mean of the exchange rate returns is positive. Put differently, the cumulative effect of 
intervention is statistically significant and intervention influences exchange rates as intended 
during the second period which accounts for 80 percent of our sample.  
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While the primary purpose of our analysis is to assess the effect of intervention on the 
conditional mean of the exchange rate, our econometric methodology also provides some insights 
regarding the volatility effects of intervention. Table 4 displays the results of the volatility model 
described in equation (2). Only when estimating the volatility model across sub-sample 1 do we 
find significant effects of intervention (consistent with reduced volatility). Intervention has no 
significant volatility effects across either the full sample or sub-sample 2. Overall, these results do 
not suggest that intervention exerts a strong influence on exchange rate volatility. 
Section 7 discusses why intervention is ineffective in sub-sample 1 but effective in sub-
sample 2, the delayed effects of intervention, and the significant effects in the “wrong” direction.  
 
5.1 The Fit of the Model 
The validity of the WLS estimation procedure is contingent on the volatility model described by 
equation (2). This section assesses the fit of the model and the success of the WLS procedure. 
As mentioned, Table 4 shows the results of the volatility model estimation. The F-
statistic (Wald test) associated with testing whether all of the estimated coefficients are jointly 
zero rejects this hypothesis for the full sample as well as for both sub-samples. However, the 
rejection level is substantially different across the full and the two sub-samples. The test statistic 
is only 7 for sub-sample 1 but higher than 300 for the full sample and for sub-sample 2. 
Furthermore, nearly all the trigonometric terms are insignificant for sub-sample 1 while nearly all 
the trigonometric terms are significant for the full sample and for sub-sample 2. This indicates 
that our volatility model captures the intraday periodicity for sub-sample 2 but less so for sub-
sample 1, i.e. the fit of the volatility model is better for sub-sample 2.28
                                                 
28 Importantly, our HAC robustness tests (discussed in the next section) also reject that intervention is 
effective during sub-sample 1, implying that the less than perfect fit of the WLS estimation across sub-
sample 1 is not the reason why we fail to find significant effects of intervention during the first 20 percent 
our data. 
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As another measure of fit we once again follow Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega 
(2003) and display in Figures 3a (sub-sample 1) and 3b (sub-sample 2) plots of the absolute 
average residuals (for each 5 minute interval across all the included 752 trading days) estimated 
from the initial OLS regression of equation (1) juxtaposed against the fitted absolute average 
residuals from the estimation of equation (2). As the plot shows, our volatility model provides a 
good fit for both sub-samples.29  
Figure 4 provides another measure of the overall success of our econometric procedure. 
The dark observations are the raw foreign exchange rate returns while the light observations are 
our fitted foreign exchange rate returns. The figure at the top plots the fitted returns from our 
initial OLS estimation of equation (1) against the raw returns. The OLS procedure clearly fails to 
capture the pattern of the raw returns. The figure at the bottom plots the fitted returns from our 
WLS estimation of equation (1) against the raw returns. Comparison of the two figures further 
confirms the success of the WLS procedure. 
 
6. Robustness 
In order to test the robustness of our results, we carry out the analysis using a different 
econometric procedure, a different intervention lag-structure, and different RV measures. 
Additionally, we control for the timed announcement of other Danish and EUR macro news. 
First, the gain in efficiency from the WLS procedure is potentially costly in terms of 
inconsistent estimates if the residuals from the initial estimation of equation (1) are improperly 
fitted in the volatility model described by equation (2). In order to address this potential concern 
we momentarily disregard the two-step WLS procedure and, instead, estimate the effects of 
                                                 
29 We use relatively many (8) sine and cosine terms compared to other applications of the methodology 
(see, for example, Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega, 2003, Andersson, Hansen, and Sebestyén, 
2006, and Beattie and Fillion, 1999, who typically use only 4 or 5). This is, however, not surprising. The 
previously discussed properties of the Danish currency market forced us to model a relatively short interval 
of the business day where the intra-day periodicity is jagged. We therefore need several terms to fit the 
many jags. 
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intervention on exchange rate returns using heteroskedasticity- and serial-correlation consistent 
(HAC) standard errors (i.e. we re-estimate equation (1) using HAC errors). The HAC results 
displayed in Table 5 are qualitatively identical to the conditional mean results based on the more 
sophisticated two-step WLS procedure.30
Second, in order to test for delayed effects of intervention beyond the 6th lag captured by 
our baseline model, we re-estimate our models with 12 lags of intervention included. We do so 
using both the WLS and the HAC procedure. Table 6 displays the results based on the HAC 
procedure. While the 7th and the 10th lags are marginally significant in sub-sample 1 and the 7th 
lag is significant in sub-sample 2, our previously discussed results regarding cumulative effects 
remain. Furthermore, when using instead the WLS procedure (not shown for brevity), the two 
marginally significant effects in sub-sample 2 become insignificant, confirming that it takes about 
30 minutes before the exchange rate has fully adjusted to an intervention operation. 
Third, while our baseline model uses a RV measure based on 30 minute frequency 
returns (pertaining to equation 2), we also estimate the model using RV measures based on 10 
and 60 minute frequency returns. Our results (not shown for brevity) are robust across each of 
these RV measures.31  
Fourth, we know from Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998) and Andersen, Bollerslev, 
Diebold and Vega (2003) and others that exchange rates respond to (non-intervention) macro 
news. In order to ensure that our estimated effects of intervention are not tainted by the 
coincidental arrival of other macro news we extend our analysis to include several types of both 
Danish and EUR macro news. Specifically, we include additional explanatory variables capturing 
                                                 
30 As previously mentioned, Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) also use HAC estimations to 
test the robustness of their WLS generated results. They offer a detailed discussion of why the WLS 
procedure is the more appealing of the two. 
31 Moreover, we find that the baseline 30 minute RV measure fits the data the best (as measured by t-
ratios). Our findings are, furthermore, robust to replacing the RV series with the daily volatility series 
derived from a standard GARCH(1,1) model (as originally proposed by Andersen and Bollerslev 1998). In 
terms of t-ratios, the model using daily volatilities derived from the GARCH(1,1) estimation is 
outperformed by any of the RV-based models, regardless of the specific RV measure. 
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timed news releases by Statistics Denmark regarding balance of payments, CPI, EU harmonized 
CPI, real activity, unemployment, and consumer expectations. In the same fashion we also 
control for timed macro announcements from the ECB. As expected, several of these news 
variables are significant. Most important to our investigation, our results regarding the effects of 
intervention are completely unaffected by the inclusion of these control variables.32
 
7. Discussion 
We are unable to detect a significant cumulative effect of intervention for sub-sample 1 while we 
find robust significant evidence of effectiveness when analyzing sub-sample 2, the latter 80 
percent of our sample. Before we discuss why intervention is ineffective in sub-sample 1 but 
effective in sub-sample 2, it is useful to assess the economic significance of our results.  
In the case of sub-sample 1, the cumulative effect of intervention is statistically 
insignificant and, therefore, the economic impact is nil. The statistically significant coefficient 
estimate associated with the cumulative effect of intervention across sub-sample 2 is 0.3e(-6), or 
0.0000006, and pertains to an intervention operation of EUR 1 million. This implies that a EUR 
100 million intervention is, on average, associated with a 0.003% change in the level of the 
DKK/EUR exchange rate. This suggests that, regardless of the statistically significance, the 
economic importance of intervention is negligible.33  
However, a closer look at the intervention variable in conjunction with the economic 
fundamentals reveals that this is not the whole story. As Sarno and Taylor (2001, p. 850) note, 
“[Intervention] policies which are inconsistent with the underlying stance of monetary and fiscal 
policy are doomed to ultimate failure”. With respect to fundamentals and, in particular, the 
                                                 
32 The overview of timed news releases from Statistics Denmark and the ECB, and the associated 
robustness results, are not shown for brevity but available from the authors upon request. 
33 By contrast, Dominguez and Frankel (1993) estimate the economic effect of an unannounced USD 100 
million Bundesbank intervention to move the DEM/USD exchange rate by 0.081% and Kearns and 
Rigobon (2005) estimate the effect of a USD 100 million intervention to move the exchange rate by 1.8% 
in the case of the AUD/USD rate and 0.2% in the case of the JPY/USD. Both studies examine daily data. 
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monetary policy stance, our two sample periods are distinctly different. Throughout sub-sample 1 
the Danish policy rate was held constant at 3.25%, i.e. the monetary policy stance was 
unchanged. During sub-sample 2, however, monetary policy was easing as the policy rate was 
gradually changed from 3.25% to 2% (see Danmarks Nationalbank 2002, 2003b and 2004).34 
Therefore, interventions during sub-sample 1 (all purchases of EUR) were neither consistent nor 
inconsistent with the Danish fundamentals while intervention purchases of EUR during sub-
sample 2 were consistent with fundamentals but intervention sales were inconsistent. To pursue 
this further, we re-estimate the effects of intervention across sub-sample 2 (using the WLS 
procedure) with intervention sales and purchases entering as separate explanatory variables.35 We 
find that intervention sales (inconsistent with monetary policy easing) are statistically 
insignificant and we find that intervention purchases (consistent with monetary policy easing) are 
significant. Moreover, the coefficient estimate associated with the cumulative effect of 
intervention purchases is 0.3e(-4), implying that the economic impact of “consistent intervention” 
is such that a EUR 100 million intervention is, on average, associated with a 0.3% change in the 
exchange rate. In other words, the economic impact of consistent intervention is substantial. 
Microstructure models of intervention suggest that the effects of intervention depend on 
the state of the foreign exchange market.36 Furthermore, microstructure theory suggests that 
periods of high volatility correspond to a high concentration of informed trading.37 Dominguez 
(2003) examines whether intervention is more effective during a high degree of informed trading 
and finds that the intraday price effect of Fed intervention in the DEM/USD market is 28 percent 
higher when the degree of informed trading is high.38 Our two sub-samples are associated with 
very different degrees of DKK/EUR exchange rate volatility. Figure 1 shows that the exchange 
                                                 
34 The ECB monetary policy stance was also unchanged during Sample 1 and eased during Sample 2. The 
monetary policy easing of the ECB during Sample 2 occurred at a slower pace compared to the Danish 
monetary policy easing. 
35 These results are not shown for brevity but available from the authors upon request. 
36 See Pasquariello (2006b) and Vitale (2006). 
37 See the information microstructure model of Admati and Pfleiderer (1988). 
38 Dominguez (2003) uses trading volume as a measure of the degree of informed trading. 
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rate swings during the first sub-sample are noticeably smaller than during the second sub-sample. 
To quantify the difference in volatility across the two sub-samples we calculate the daily RV 
(using 5-minute exchange rate returns). Figure 5 displays the plot of the RV across the full 
sample period. The figure shows a relatively calm first sub-sample against a much more volatile 
second sub-sample. In fact, the average RV across sub-sample 1 is 70 percent lower than the 
average RV across the latter sub-sample. Put differently, we find that intervention is effective 
during the high volatility period while we find no significant cumulative effects of intervention 
during the low volatility period. This is consistent with the findings of Dominguez (2003).39  
Table 7 presents an overview of exchange rate volatility, direction of monetary policy 
(fundamentals) and results (statistically as well as economically) across the two sub-samples. 
Turning to the speed of the adjustment process, it seems surprising that it takes about 30 
minutes before the exchange rate has fully absorbed the intervention news. At a first glance, this 
finding seems to counter the conclusions of the intraday studies by Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne 
(1998) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003) who show that the conditional mean 
of the exchange rate generally adjusts immediately (i.e. jumps) in response to macro news. 
However, the findings of their studies pertain to macro news where the announcement time is 
known in advance. This is clearly not the case in our context of intervention news. DN 
interventions are unannounced and carried out on a discretionary basis and, therefore, the foreign 
exchange market participants cannot know in advance whether an intervention will occur and if 
so at what time. In other words, the aforementioned studies investigate how exchange rates 
respond to scheduled news whereas we investigate how exchange rates respond to non-scheduled 
news. Our findings suggest that the adjustment process in case of the latter is not instantaneous. 
                                                 
39  In a recent study of daily effects of Japanese foreign exchange intervention, Fatum and Hutchison (2006) 
also find evidence of differing effects of intervention across (three) distinct sub-samples. They suggest that 
an inverse relationship between intervention frequency and effectiveness is the explanation. In our context, 
however, we can disregard this frequency explanation since the frequency of DN intervention is virtually 
the same in both our sub-samples. 
 21
Moreover, recent theoretical work on microstructure models of intervention shows that 
the specific way in which interventions are carried out matter for their effectiveness.40 We suspect 
that the way the DN intervention transactions are carried out may offer an important element 
towards explaining why we observe a gradual adjustment process as well as initial effects in the 
opposite direction of what is intended. During the period under study about half of the 
intervention transactions are carried out by phone, i.e. directly between the DN dealer in charge 
of the intervention operation and the commercial bank counterpart.41 Intervention by phone 
implies that the instant the intervention operation is conducted and for a short duration thereafter, 
only this particular counterpart is aware of the intervention news while the rest of the market is 
momentarily unaware. Put differently, while the intervention transaction time-stamp provides the 
exact time of the transaction between DN and the particular market counterpart, the specific way 
in which the transaction is carried out determines whether this is also the exact time that the 
general market becomes aware of the intervention news. As a result of intervening by phone, it 
may take longer before the general market has fully absorbed these intervention operations. 
Another seemingly surprising finding is the significant effects in the “wrong” direction of 
the contemporaneous and the first lag of intervention. Our conjecture is that the fact that 
intervention is unannounced and, furthermore, in some cases carried out by phone, can offer one 
possible explanation. The DN intervention policy is characterized as leaning-against-the-wind, 
i.e. the DN intervenes against the prevailing exchange rate trend (for example, the DN sells DKK 
and buys EUR in response to a DKK appreciation vis-à-vis the EUR). If the general market is 
initially unaware of the intervention operation and, therefore, has not yet absorbed and adjusted to 
the intervention news, then the exchange rate at the instant the intervention occurs and for a brief 
period thereafter is not responding to the intervention but, instead, it continues the trend that 
                                                 
40 See Vitale (2006). 
41 Since early 2005 (i.e. after our sample period ended) all DN interventions have been carried out using a 
centralized market place. We do not currently have access to DN intervention data encompassing only 
intervention transactions by centralized trading. Investigating the importance of switching from phone and 
centralized trading to only centralized trading is, therefore, left for future research. 
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brought about the leaning-against-the-wind intervention operation. In that case, the significant 
effects in the “wrong” direction do not constitute a perverse response to intervention but, instead, 
the continuation of the exchange rate movement that made the DN deem the intervention 
operation necessary in the first place.42
 
8. Conclusion 
This paper investigates the real-time (intraday) effects of Danish intervention in the EUR market 
over the 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004 period, using proprietary intraday intervention data 
provided by the Danish central bank. Denmark is currently pursuing an active intervention policy 
under the provisions of ERM II. Prior participation in ERM II is a requirement for adoption of the 
EUR, thus the Danish exchange rate management experience seems particularly relevant for not 
only Denmark but also for the 6 new European Union (EU) member states that are also currently 
participating in ERM II. 
We use the WLS time-series econometrics of Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) and 
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega (2003). In addition, we follow Andrews (2003) and 
detect a structural break in our data and, consequently, we carry out our investigation on our full 
sample as well as separately across two sub-samples. We perform several robustness tests. We 
replace the two-step WLS estimation procedure with the one-step HAC estimation, extend the 
number of lags of intervention included in our models, use different RV measures, and control for 
other timed Danish and EUR macroeconomic news. The robustness tests confirm the results of 
our baseline analysis. 
                                                 
42 Figure 6 shows the average unconditional change in the 5-minute exchange rate return across the 60 
minutes preceding interventions (returns are normalized to allow for an aggregation of both purchases and 
sales of DKK). Supporting our conjecture, the figure shows the downward sloping trend in the exchange 
rate return that, if intervention is initially unnoticed by the broader market and the trend continues, would 
be consistent with exchange rate movements in the “wrong” direction coinciding with the contemporaneous 
and the first lag of intervention. Figure 6 also confirms that the interventions under study are consistent 
with a leaning-against-the-wind policy and that intervention does not appear to be responding to the 
contemporaneous exchange rate movement. The latter implies that our results are free of simultaneity bias. 
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We find evidence that intervention affects the level of the exchange rate in the intended 
direction. This is in line with the results of the intraday studies by Fatum and King (2005), 
Fischer and Zurlinden (1999), Pasquariello (2006a), Payne and Vitale (2003) and others. This 
result pertains to 80 percent of our sample period (sub-sample 2). We find no significant 
cumulative effects of intervention when analyzing the full sample and separately the first 20 
percent of our sample period (sub-sample 1). 
During the first part of our sample, the Danish monetary policy stance was held constant 
and, therefore, intervention during sub-sample 1 was neither consistent nor inconsistent with 
monetary policy fundamentals. During the second part of our sample, however, monetary policy 
was easing. Accordingly, intervention sales of EUR were inconsistent with fundamentals while 
intervention purchases of EUR were consistent. When we re-estimate the effects of intervention 
across sub-sample 2 with intervention sales and purchases entering as separate explanatory 
variables, we find that intervention sales are statistically insignificant while intervention 
purchases are significant. The coefficient estimate associated with the cumulative effect of 
intervention purchases during sub-sample 2 implies that a EUR 100 million intervention is, on 
average, associated with a 0.3% change in the exchange rate. This result suggests that 
fundamentals matter for the effectiveness of intervention and shows that the economic impact of 
“consistent intervention” is substantial. 
Microstructure models of intervention predict that the effects of intervention depend on 
the state of the exchange rate market. We observe a marked difference in exchange rate volatility 
across our two sub-samples, with an average RV across sub-sample 1 that is 70 percent lower 
than the average RV across sub-sample 2. Taken together with our results, therefore, this suggests 
that intervention is effective when the exchange rate market is volatile, consistent with a high 
concentration of informed trading, and ineffective when it is calm, consistent with a low degree 
of informed trading. This is in line with Dominguez (2003), who finds that the intraday effects of 
Fed intervention are stronger when the degree of informed trading is high. 
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We also find that it takes at least 30 minutes before the exchange rate has fully adjusted 
to the intervention news. This is not surprising when we consider that Danish interventions are 
unannounced and carried out on a discretionary basis and, therefore, the exchange rate market 
does not know in advance whether an intervention will occur and if so at what time. Furthermore, 
institutional details regarding the specific way in which a large part of the Danish intervention 
transactions in our sample is carried out - by phone as opposed to via centralized electronic 
trading - further help explain the observed delayed exchange rate response. 
In conclusion, our study supports the following normative recommendations for 
intervention policy: 
- Intervention is an important short-term policy instrument for 
 exchange rate management 
- The effectiveness of intervention depends on whether intervention is consistent 
 with monetary policy fundamentals 
- The economic effect of an intervention that is consistent with fundamentals and 
 carried out during a period of relatively high exchange rate volatility is 
 substantial while the economic effect of an intervention in the opposite direction of 
 fundamentals is negligible 
- The exchange rate does not adjust instantaneously to discretionary and 
 unannounced interventions and, therefore, it is necessary to allow for an 
 adjustment period of at least 30 minutes before assessing the full effect of an 
 intervention operation. 
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics for the Intervention Variable 
 
Number of 
Interventions 
Average amount 
(mill. EUR) 
Daily interventions 
All 89 164 
Purchases  68 158 
Sales 21 -182 
Intraday interventions 
All 220 67 
Purchases  157 69 
Sales 63 61 
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TABLE 2: Summary Statistics for 5 Minute DKK/EUR Exchange Rate Returns 
Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
 
0 
(~0) 
0.00013 
(-) 
0.0146 
(0.0086) 
18** 
(0.0173) 
Minimum Maximum 
BJ-test for 
normality LB Q-test (5-day lag) 
-0.1724 
 
0.2215 
 
 
754720 
 [5.99] 
16068  
[595] 
 
NOTES:   
 
Data runs from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2004. 
The data consists of 80476 observations on DKK/EUR exchange rate 
The returns are calculated from bid- and ask prices from Olsen Financial 
Technologies. 
* Denotes significance at 90%, ** Denotes significance at 95%, *** Denotes 
significance at 99% 
Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; critical values in [ ]. 
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TABLE 3: WLS Estimation of Equation (1): Mean Equation 
 Full Sample Sub-sample I Sub-sample II 
Constant (e-6) 
)0(β   0.004 
 (0.0333) 
-0.15
 (0.7142) 
0.06 
 (0.2857) 
Lags of FX-returns 
)1(β  -0.64*** 
 (0.0067) 
-0.76*** 
 (0.0097) 
-0.61*** 
 (0.0078) 
)2(β  -0.45*** 
 (0.0075) 
-0.58*** 
 (0.0116) 
-0.43*** 
 (0.0086) 
)3(β  -0.31*** 
 (0.0070) 
-0.42*** 
 (0.0119) 
-0.29*** 
 (0.0079) 
)4(β  -0.20*** 
 (0.0063) 
-0.26*** 
 (0.0107) 
-0.19*** 
 (0.0072) 
)5(β  -0.10*** 
 (0.0050) 
-0.13*** 
 (0.0082) 
-0.10*** 
 (0.0061) 
Interventions (e-6) 
)0(γ  -0.15*** 
(0.0560) 
-0.32  
(0.4638) 
-0.08 
 (0.0696) 
)1(γ  -0.16*** 
(0.0578) 
-0.26* 
 (0.1844) 
-0.17*** 
 (0.0369) 
)2(γ  0.06 
(0.0632) 
0.06 
 (0.1579) 
0.04 
 (0.0702) 
)3(γ  -0.05 
(0.0714) 
-0.03 
 (0.1250) 
-0.06 
 (0.0857) 
)4(γ  0.13** 
(0.0578) 
0.12  
(0.1091) 
0.10* 
 (0.0676) 
)5(γ  0.12** 
 (0.0533) 
-0.13  
(0.1429) 
0.36*** 
 (0.0679) 
)6(γ  0.15*** 
(0.0641) 
0.16*  
 (0.1185) 
0.11 
 (0.0859) 
30 min sum (e-6) 
intervention 
coefficient. (Robust 
Wald statistic) 
0.1 
[1.91] 
 
-0.39 
[0.63] 
 
0.31*** 
[7.28] 
 
#Interventions 220 58 162 
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** Denotes significance at 95%, *** Denotes 
significance at 99% 
(b)    Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; test statistic values in [ ]; lags in ( ) 
in Variable Names 
(c)    The dependent variable is the first difference of the log of the daily DKK/EUR mid-
point exchange rate.  
(d)    The independent variables are current and lags of intervention and lags of the 
dependent variable.  
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TABLE 4: Estimation of Equation (2): Volatility Equation 
 Full-sample  Sub-sample I Sub-sample II 
Constants 
Constant 0.0025*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0004 
 (0.0007) 
0.003*** 
 (0.0005) 
Normalising constant I -0.0019*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0003 
 (0.0005) 
-0.003*** 
 (0.0005) 
Normalising constant II 0.0002*** 
 (0.00004) 
-0.0004 
 (0.0006) 
0.0003*** 
 (0.00005) 
Interday-volatility 
Realised-vol/GARCH 0.27*** 
 (0.005) 
0.13*** 
 (0.016) 
0.27***  
(0.005) 
Sine-terms (e-3)   
)1(δ  -0.103*** 
(0.017) 
0.021 
 (0.028) 
-0.14***  
(0.02) 
)2(δ  -0.01*** 
(0.0017) 
0.001 
 (0.003) 
-0.012*** 
 (0.002) 
)3(δ  0.006*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.003* 
 (0.002) 
0.008*** 
 (0.0015) 
)4(δ  0.0064*** 
(0.0014) 
-0.002 
 (0.002) 
0.009*** 
 (0.0017) 
)5(δ  0.004*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.002* 
 (0.001) 
0.006*** 
 (0.0011) 
)6(δ  0.0031*** 
(0.0006) 
0.001 
 (0.002) 
0.004*** 
 (0.0007) 
)7(δ  -0.0021*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0004 
 (0.0007) 
-0.003*** 
 (0.0007) 
)8(δ  -0.0013*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0003*** 
 (0.00006) 
-0.002*** 
 (0.0007) 
Cosine-terms (e-3)   
)1(ϕ  0.08*** 
(0.0148) 
-0.015 
(0.0428) 
0.11*** 
 (0.0182) 
)2(ϕ  0.03*** 
(0.0054) 
-0.006  
(0.0085) 
0.042*** 
 (0.0067) 
)3(ϕ  0.013*** 
(0.0024) 
-0.004 
 (0.0055) 
0.017*** 
 (0.0027) 
)4(ϕ  0.004*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.001 
 (0.0010) 
0.005*** 
 (0.0009) 
)5(ϕ  0.0004 
(0.0057) 
-0.0001 
 (0.0003) 
0.0002 
 (0.0009) 
)6(ϕ  -0.003*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.001 
 (0.0077) 
-0.003*** 
 (0.0008) 
)7(ϕ  -0.001** 
(0.0005) 
0.001 
 (0.0018) 
-0.002*** 
 (0.0008) 
)8(ϕ  0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.002 
 (0.0035) 
-0.0001 
 (0.0005) 
Interest differentials (e-3)      
)1(η  -0.14*** 
(0.014) 
-0.007* 
 (0.0036) 
-0.002 
 (0.0030) 
)2(η   0.57** 
(0.2591) 
0.55 
 (3.438) 
-0.0003 
 (0.0050) 
)3(η  -0.36* 
(0.2118) 
-0.48*** 
 (0.0918) 
0.003 
 (0.0029) 
Interventions (e-6) 
)0(γ    -0.07 
(0.0680) 
-0.33*** 
 (0.0636) 
0.03 
 (0.1035) 
)1(γ  0.07 
(0.0700) 
0.01 
 (0.1250) 
0.11 
 (0.0909) 
)2(γ  0.08 
(0.0899) 
0.08 
 (0.1231) 
0.09 
 (0.1139) 
)3(γ  -0.04 
(0.0755) 
-0.09 
 (0.0776) 
-0.03 
 (0.0938) 
)4(γ  -0.06 
(0.0769) 
-0.13* 
 (0.0823) 
-0.03 
 (0.0968) 
)5(γ  0.07 
(0.0833) 
-0.004 
 (0.0098) 
0.10 
 (0.1020) 
)6(γ  -0.05 
(0.0794) 
-0.18*** 
 (0.0690) 
-0.004 
 (0.1) 
 33
Statistics 
2R  0.11 0.01 0.12 
F-statistic for all variables jointly are 0 329 7 304 
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** Denotes significance at 95%, *** Denotes significance at 
99% 
(b)    Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates;  lags in ( ) in Variable Names 
(c)    The dependent variable is the absolute residual from the auxiliary regression, equation (1).  
(d)    The independent variables are normalizing constants, a realized volatility measure, 
trigonometric terms, the EUR-DKK interest rate differential, and interventions.  
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TABLE 5: HAC Estimation of Equation (1): Mean Equation 
 Full-sample  Sub-sample I Sub-sample II 
Interventions (e-6) 
)0(γ  -0.12* 
(0.0706) 
-0.28*** 
(0.00729) 
-0.07 
(0.0875) 
)1(γ  -0.18*** 
(0.0776) 
-0.26* 
(0.1857) 
-0.18** 
(0.0896) 
)2(γ  0.14* 
(0.0966) 
0.06 
(0.1714) 
0.15* 
(0.1154) 
)3(γ  -0.08 
(0.0666) 
-0.02 
(0.1250) 
-0.11 
(0.0880) 
)4(γ  0.16*** 
(0.0690) 
0.15 
(01220) 
0.16* 
(0.0842) 
)5(γ  0.14* 
(0.0897) 
-0.14 
(0.1505) 
0.24** 
(0.1076) 
)6(γ  0.15* 
(0.0938) 
0.10 
(0.0990) 
0.15* 
(0.1154) 
30 min sum (e-6) of 
intervention 
coefficient. [Robust 
Wald statistic] 
0.1 
[1.91] 
 
-0.39 
[2.04] 
 
0.35** 
[6.35] 
 
#Interventions 220 58 162 
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** Denotes significance at 95%, *** Denotes 
significance at 99% 
(b)    Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; test statistic values in [ ]; lags in ( ) 
in Variable Names 
(c)    The dependent variable is the first difference of the log of the daily DKK/EUR mid-
point exchange rate.  
(d)    The independent variable is current and lagged intervention. 
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TABLE 6: WLS Estimation of Equation (1): Mean Equation with 12 lags of 
                  Intervention 
 Sub-sample I Sub-sample II 
Interventions (e-6) 
)0(γ  -0.34 
(2.615) 
-0.08 
(0.0714) 
)1(γ  -0.25 
(0.1825) 
-0.16*** 
(0.0442) 
)2(γ  0.07 
(0.1667) 
0.05 
(0.0725) 
)3(γ  -0.03 
(0.1579) 
-0.06 
(0.0822) 
)4(γ  0.14 
(0.1111) 
0.11* 
(0.0714) 
)5(γ  -0.15 
(0.1471) 
0.32*** 
(0.0792) 
)6(γ  0.20 
(0.2899) 
0.12* 
(0.0863) 
)7(γ  0.20* 
(0.1408) 
0.06** 
(0.0300) 
)8(γ  -0.14 
(0.1176) 
-0.02 
(0.2000) 
)9(γ  -0.09 
(0.1500) 
0.05 
(0.1220) 
)10(γ  -0.14* 
(0.1037) 
-0.06 
(0.0772) 
)11(γ  0.16 
(0.2857) 
-0.001 
(0.1111) 
)12(γ  -0.13 
(0.1733) 
0.07 
(0.0875) 
60 min sum (e-6) of 
intervention coefficient. 
[Robust Wald statistic] 
-0.05 
[0.05] 
0.4* 
[2.75] 
#Interventions 58 162 
 
NOTES: 
(a)   * Denotes significance at 90%, ** Denotes significance at 95%, *** 
Denotes significance at 99% 
(b)    Standard Errors in ( ) below the point estimates; test statistic values in [ ]; 
lags in ( ) in Variable Names 
(c)    The dependent variable is the first difference of the log of the daily 
DKK/EUR mid-point exchange rate.  
(d)    The independent variable is current and lagged intervention. 
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Table 7 Overview of Exchange Rate Volatility, Fundamentals and Results across Sub-Samples 
   
 Sub-Sample 1 Sub-Sample 2 
Exchange Rate Volatility (RV) LOW HIGH 
Fundamentals (F) MONETARY POLICY 
UNCHANGED 
MONETARY POLICY 
EASING 
Intervention SALES and Fundamentals 
(F) 
N.A. 
(no sales; no change in F) 
INCONSISTENT 
Intervention PURCHASES and 
Fundamentals (F) 
N.A. 
(no change in F) 
CONSISTENT 
Effectiveness of Intervention: ALL STATISTICALLY 
INSIGNIFICANT 
STATISTICALLY 
SIGNIFICANT 
Economic Effect of 100 million EUR 
Intervention: ALL 
STATISTICALLY 
INSIGNIFICANT 
0.003% 
Economic Effect of 100 million EUR 
Intervention: SALES 
N.A. 
(no sales) 
STATISTICALLY 
INSIGNIFICANT 
Economic Effect of 100 million EUR 
Intervention: PURCHASES 
STATISTICALLY 
INSIGNIFICANT 
0.3% 
Notes: 
a) Sub-sample 1 runs from 1 January 2002 to 16 August 2002; sub-sample 2 runs from 17 August 2002 to 31 
December 2004 
b) Realized exchange rate volatility (RV) is calculated using 5-minute exchange rate returns 
c) Fundamentals correspond to the direction of monetary policy based on changes in the DN policy rate (the 
Folio rate) 
d) An intervention sale denotes a sale of EUR against a purchase of DKK; An intervention purchase denotes a 
purchase of EUR against a sale of DKK 
e) An intervention sale (purchase) is consistent with monetary policy tightening (easing) 
f) Effectiveness of intervention pertains to the cumulative effect of intervention shown in Table 3 
g) Economic effect of ALL pertains to the impact of the average cumulative effect across both intervention 
sales and purchases. The sub-sample 2 coefficient estimate of 0.0000003 displayed in Table 3 implies that 
an intervention of EUR 100 million leads to a 0.003% change in the level of the DKK/EUR exchange rate 
h) The economic effect of intervention sales and purchases, respectively, is based on WLS estimations of the 
cumulative effect of intervention with intervention sales and purchases entering as separate explanatory 
variables (not shown for brevity). The sub-sample 2 economic effect associated with the cumulative effect 
of an intervention purchase stems from a coefficient estimate of 0.00003 
i) The economic effect associated with a statistically insignificant coefficient estimate is also labeled 
statistically insignificant. 
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 Figure 1  DKK/EUR and Interventions 
 
 
 
Notes: 5 min. DKK/EUR spot exchange rate returns and interventions in mill. EUR over the 1 
January 2002 to 31 December 2004 period. A positive intervention corresponds to a net-purchase 
of EUR against a sale of DKK. The upper and lower lines are the ERM II deviation bands. 
Interventions are plotted against the central exchange rate at 7.46038.  
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 Figure 2  Correlogram: 5 Min. Returns and Absolute Returns 
 
 
 
Notes: DKK/EUR spot exchange rate returns over the 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004 
period. Dotted lines correspond to confidence intervals for a white-noise process.
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 Figure 3a Actual and Fitted Intraday Volatility: Sub-sample 1 
 
 
 Figure 3b  Actual and Fitted Intraday Volatility: Sub-sample 2 
 
 
Notes: Average residuals for each 5 min. interval across 752 days against the absolute average 
fitted residuals from Equation 2 (dotted line). 
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 Figure 4  Fit With and Without the WLS Methodology 
 
  
 
Notes: The dark observations are the raw exchange rate returns; the light observations are the 
fitted exchange rate returns. The figure at the top plots the fitted returns from the initial 
estimation of Equation (1).The lower graph shows the fitted returns from the WLS procedure of 
Equations (1) and (2). 
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 Figure 5  RV Using 5 Minute Returns 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows realized volatility for the DKK/EUR exchange rate over the 1 January 
2002 to 31 December 2004 period. The realized volatility is calculated as the average of the sum 
of the squared returns across each day in the sample. 
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Figure 6 Mean Exchange Rate Return Prior to Intervention 
 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the average unconditional change in the 5-minute exchange rate return 
across the 60 minutes preceding interventions (returns are normalized to allow for an aggregation 
of both positive and negative interventions). 
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